Svedoci smo agresivnog povećanja kamatnih stopa u cilju ublažavanja inflacije, usled pritisaka rastuće tražnje i globalnih poremećaja cena energenata i hrane!?! Ili je to posledica dosadašnje loše prakse nekontrolisanog rasta likvidnosti finansijskog sektora, akumulacije kapitala usled neizvesnosti tržišta, kao i mera ekonomske politike, pasivizacije investitora tokom izolacije, a još više, pređašnje veštački održavane niske inflacije i nulte kamatne stope? Gotovo sve ekonomije zapadne hemisfere beleže agresivan rast kamatnih stopa da bi ubliažili snažne inflatorne pritiske koje, po njihovim procenama, dolaze sa strane tražnje. Pogrešno je delovati preko strane tražnje na tržištu, na kome izvor problema postoji na strane ponude. Suprotno njima, zemlje Azije snižavaju kamatne stope podstičući ekonomije kroz stranu tražnje.
Postojeća inflacija nije isključivo posledica tržišnih kretanja ponude i tražnje, već očekivanja i ranije prekomerne ekspanzivne monetarne politike. Kvantitativne olakšice (QE) povećavale su likvidnost tokom ekonomske krize, ali se ta likvidnost većinom zadržavala na finansijskom tržištu gde su cene imovine značajno porasle. Realni sektor nije osećao inflaciju. Tokom kovid-19 pandemije, uz investicionu apstinenciju i nižu sklonost ka ličnoj potrošnji, došlo je do gomilanja novca, da bi energetska kriza uticala na rast cene gasa na svetskom tržištu, i rast cena na neelastičnom tržištu poljoprivrednih proizvoda (nedovoljno brz rast poljoprivredne proizvodnje, iako rastu cene poljoprivrednih proizvoda). Tržište je sada reagovalo! Prvo se pojavila inflacija tražnje (AD>AS), koja se potom prelila u inflaciju troškova (rast troškova proizvodnje, npr. zarada utiče na rast cena). Konačno, došlo je do strukturne inflacije u kojoj privreda (preduzetnici i proizvođači) ne uspeva da rastuće troškove proizvodnje prilagodi cenama koje „divljaju“. I to u oba njena pojavna oblika. Prvo, rast tražnje u jednom sektoru vodi rastu cena tog sektora, potom i rastu opšteg nivoa cena. Drugo, sve je izraženija disproporcija resursa i njihova alokacija, unutar i po sektorima. Otuda, ova krizna situacija ne može se rešiti podizanjem kamatnih stopa i delovanjem na strani tražnje. Zašto? Porast kamatne stope usporiće privrednu aktivnost, poskupeće novac, povećaće stepen zaduživanja ekonomija i sniziti životni standard građana. Usporavanje agregatne tražnje (lična, investiciona i javna potrošnja) neminovno voditi padu BDP. To će dalje voditi rastu zaduživanja, jer se smanjuje prihod od poreza, uz sve veće javne rashode. Drugim rečima, ekonomije se suočavaju sa smanjenjem realne vrednosti naplate poreza i rasta novčane vrednosti rashoda. To dalje znači, da će ovakva ekonomska logika povećati siromašenje država i građana. Rešenje treba tražiti na strani pounde adekvatnom podsticajnim miksom fiskalne i monetarne politike. Ilustrativni pimer problema na strani ponude je čovek koji sa 100.000 evra ulazi u salon automobila. Danas će platiti za automobil koji će biti mu biti isporučen za 6 do 12 meseci, dok je u periodu 2002-2005. mogao da plati i odveze dva takva automobila.
Strukturnu inflaciju često prati i gubitak vrednosti nacionalne valute. I to ne samo zbog većih uvoznih cena i manjeg priliva izvoznih prihoda (usled poremećaja na tržištu), već i zbog pogrešnih mera monetarne politike. ECB nije odgovorio adekvatnim merama na agresivno podizanje kamatnih stopa FED-a. Dolar je ojačao u odnosu na Evro, što je očekivano prema teoriji kamatnih pariteta – očekivana deprecijacija evra. Cena kasnog odgovora može se posmatrati i iz drugog ugla. Možda, to nije bila greška ECB, već spremnost na žrtvu. Slab evro omogućava: 1. rast konkurentnosti na svetskom tržištu, 2. smanjenje javnog duga (nominalno izraženog), 3. blaži nominalni pritisak na dospeće većeg broja HoV ECB koje dolaze na plaćanje. Sa druge strane, azijske ekonomije (Kina, Japan, Indonezija, Turska) su smanjivale kamatne stope, simulirajući efekat preskoka, čime su uspešno ublažili značajniji pad vrednosti nacionalnih valuta u odnosu na brzo jačanje US dolara posle kvantitativnog stezanja (QT) FED-a. Ruska rublja je ojačala naviše na svetskom tržištu valuta, kako zbog rasta cene nafte, novih ugovora o energentima sa azijskim partnerima, rasta tražnje za rubljama usled uslovljavanja daljeg plaćanja ruskih energenata u rubljama, suficita u robnoj razmeni sa insotranstvom, i pozitivnih privrednih tokova.
Konačno, zašto primenjene mere ekonomske politike ne daju željeni rezultat – da rast kamatnih stopa uspori inflaciju? Prvo, kriza dolazi sa strane ponude, drugo, rastu marže korporativnog sektora (duž lanaca snabdevanja). i treće, nema novih radnih mesta u očekivanom broju (u SAD je u septembru registrovano 250000 novih radnih mesta što je više od prognoziranih 205000, međutim to su većinom radna mesta nisko tehnološki-intenzivnog sektora sa nižim platama).
Izvor: Internet stranice centralnih banaka
We are witnessing an aggressive increase in interest rates in order to mitigate inflation, due to the pressures of growing demand and global disruptions in energy and food prices!?! Or is it a consequence of the previous bad practice of uncontrolled growth of financial sector liquidity, capital accumulation due to market uncertainty, as well as economic policy measures, passivation of investors during isolation, and even previously artificially maintained low inflation and zero interest rates? Almost all economies of the Western Hemisphere are recording an aggressive increase in interest rates in order to mitigate the strong inflationary pressures that, according to their estimates, come from the demand side. It is wrong to act on the demand side of the market, where the source of the problem is on the supply side. Unlike them, Asian countries lower interest rates, stimulating economies through demand.
The current inflation is not only the result of market movements of supply and demand, but also the expectations of the earlier expansionary monetary policy. Quantitative Easing (QE) increased liquidity during the economic crisis, but that liquidity was mostly retained in the financial market where asset prices rose significantly. The real sector did not feel inflation. During the covid-19 pandemic, with the abstinence of investments and a lower inclination towards personal consumption, there was an accumulation of money, so that the energy crisis would affect the increase in the price of gas on the world market, as well as the increase in the price on the inelastic market of agricultural products (insufficiently fast growth agricultural production, although the prices of agricultural products are increasing). The market has now reacted! First there was demand inflation (AD>AS), which then spilled over into cost inflation (an increase in production costs, eg wages, affects price growth). Finally, there was structural inflation where the economy (entrepreneurs and producers) failed to adjust rising production costs to „rampant“ prices. And in both forms. First, an increase in demand in one sector leads to an increase in the prices of that sector, and then to an increase in the general price level. Second, the disproportion of resources and their allocation, within and by sector, is increasingly pronounced. Therefore, this crisis situation cannot be solved by raising interest rates and acting on the demand side. Why? An increase in the interest rate will slow down economic activity, increase the price of money, increase the degree of indebtedness of the economy and lower the standard of living of citizens. A slowdown in aggregate demand (personal, investment and public spending) will inevitably lead to a fall in GDP. This will further lead to an increase in borrowing, as tax revenues decrease, along with an increase in public expenditures. In other words, economies face a decrease in the real value of tax collection and an increase in the monetary value of expenditures. This further means that this kind of economic logic will increase the impoverishment of states and citizens. The solution should be sought on the supply side with an adequate stimulating mix of fiscal and monetary policy. An illustrative example of a supply-side problem is a man who walks into a car dealership with 100,000 euros. Today he will pay for a car that will be delivered to him in 6 to 12 months, while in the period 2002-2005. could pay for and drive off two such cars.
Structural inflation is often accompanied by a loss of value of the national currency. And that’s not only because of higher import prices and less inflow of export revenues (due to disruptions in the market), but also because of wrong monetary policy measures. The ECB did not respond with adequate measures to the aggressive increase in interest rates by the FED. The dollar strengthened against the euro, which was expected according to the theory of interest parities – expected depreciation of the euro. The cost of a late response can be seen from another angle. Maybe the ECB doesn’t see a problem here, but it is ready to make a sacrifice. A weak euro enables: 1. increased competitiveness on the world market, 2. reduction of public debt (nominally expressed), 3. milder nominal pressure on the maturity of a larger number of ECB securities. On the other hand, Asian economies (China, Japan, Indonesia, Turkey) reduced interest rates, simulating the effect of an overshoot, thus successfully mitigating the significant decline in the value of national currencies in relation to the sudden strengthening of the US dollar after the FED’s Quantitative Tightening (QT). The Russian ruble strengthened upwards on the world currency market, both due to the rise in the price of oil, new energy contracts with Asian partners, and due to the increase in demand for rubles due to the conditioning of further payments of Russian energy producers in rubles, due to the foreign trade surplus and positive economic flows.
Finally, why do the applied economic policy measures not give the desired result – that the growth of interest rates slows down inflation? First, the crisis comes from the supply side, second, from the growth of corporate sector margins (along supply chains), and thirdly, there are no new jobs in the expected number (250,000 new jobs were registered in the US in September, which is more than the forecast of 205,000, but mostly jobs in the low-tech intensive sector with lower wages).
Source: Oxfam