Pravila o lobiranju postoje u većini zemalja i u mnogim slučajevima su dobro razvijena i usklađena sa međunarodnim standardima. Ipak, njihova primena ostaje selektivna, slaba i često površna. Kao rezultat toga, javne politike i dalje više odražavaju uticaj organizovanih interesnih grupa nego interese građana, dok ekonomski troškovi rastu, a poverenje u institucije opada. Problem više nije u regulativi – već u njenoj primeni.
Regulative o lobiranju značajno se razlikuju među zemljama, ali se uočava zajednički obrazac. Transparentnost u kreiranju politika ostaje ograničena bez obzira na formalna pravila. Prema podacima OECD, većina sistema zasniva se na parcijalnim pristupima i neujednačenom nadzoru, često usmerenim samo na izvršnu vlast. Tamo gde regulativa postoji, ona je obično ugrađena u primarno zakonodavstvo i podržana obaveznim registrima i zahtevima za objavljivanje podataka. Međutim, ovi mehanizmi su često uskog obuhvata i nedosledno primenjivani.
Istorijski posmatrano, mnoge zemlje su relativno rano uspostavile okvire za regulaciju lobiranja, a ovi modeli su se postepeno širili među regionima. Ipak, implementacija je ostala fragmentisana. Uprkos postojanju međunarodnih standarda, usklađenost u mnogim slučajevima ostaje ispod 40%. Regulatorni okviri su često selektivni, sa ograničenim obavezama objavljivanja i nedovoljnom pokrivenošću celokupnog procesa kreiranja politika. U praksi, to stvara sistem u kojem pravila formalno postoje, ali ne utiču efikasno na ponašanje aktera.
Većina zemalja je usvojila strateške pristupe borbi protiv korupcije, ali regulacija lobiranja i dalje zaostaje. Jaz između regulatornog dizajna i stvarne prakse je očigledan. Iako su neke zemlje nedavno unapredile svoje okvire- poput Finske i Češke, nakon ranijih reformi u Irskoj i Francuskoj – merljivi rezultati su i dalje ograničeni. Slaba primena podriva stabilnost tržišta, povećava neizvesnost, podiže troškove investicija i na kraju ograničava inovacije i privredni rast.
Podaci OECD-a potvrđuju razmere problema. Samo 7 zemalja (4 članice OECD-a i 3 partnerske zemlje) ispunjava najmanje 80% kriterijuma OECD-a za visokokvalitetnu regulaciju lobiranja. Tek 20 zemalja – otprilike jedna trećina analiziranih – dostiže 60% ili više. To ukazuje da su okviri upravljanja lobiranjem nedovoljno razvijeni i neujednačeni u velikom delu OECD prostora. Istovremeno, samo 10 zemalja OECD-a (16%) ima ciljane strategije za borbu protiv prevara u visokorizičnim oblastima kao što su poljoprivreda, socijalna davanja ili posebni programi finansiranja, uključujući fondove EU.
Srbija jasno ilustruje ovaj regulatorni paradoks. Ona pripada grupi zemalja sa relativno snažnim formalnim okvirima – ispunjava 89% regulatornih kriterijuma, zajedno sa Španijom, Kanadom, Estonijom, Meksikom, Izraelom, Slovenijom i Poljskom, kao i partnerskim zemljama poput Moldavije i Perua. Međutim, u praksi Srbija ispunjava samo 56% kriterijuma, što je svrstava ispod Španije i Moldavije (89%), na nivo Estonije i Meksika (56%), a iznad Izraela, Perua i Slovenije (33%) i Poljske (11%). Ovaj jaz između regulative i implementacije ukazuje na širi strukturni problem: pravila sama po sebi ne garantuju integritet.
U takvim uslovima, lobiranje prestaje da bude transparentan deo demokratskog odlučivanja i postaje izvor sistemskog rizika. Bez snažnije primene, veće transparentnosti i doslednijeg nadzora, okviri za regulaciju lobiranja rizikuju da ostanu formalni instrumenti sa ograničenim stvarnim uticajem – dok javne politike nastavljaju da se oblikuju više pod uticajem nego kroz odgovornost.
Izvor: OECD (Izveštaj o antikorupciji i integritetu 2026 – 37 zemalja OECD-a i 25 partnerskih zemalja)
Lobbying rules exist across most countries, and in many cases they are well developed and aligned with international standards. Yet their application remains selective, weak and often superficial. As a result, public policy continues to reflect the influence of organized interests more than the interests of citizens, while economic costs rise and trust in institutions declines. The problem is no longer regulation – it is enforcement.
Lobbying regulations vary significantly across countries, but a common pattern emerges. Transparency in policy-making remains limited regardless of the formal rules in place. According to OECD data, most systems rely on partial approaches and uneven oversight, often focused only on the executive branch. Where regulations exist, they are typically embedded in primary legislation and supported by mandatory registers and disclosure requirements. However, these mechanisms are often narrow in scope and inconsistently applied.
Historically, many countries established lobbying frameworks relatively early, and these models have gradually spread across regions. Yet implementation has remained fragmented. Despite the existence of international standards, compliance remains below 40% in many cases. Regulatory frameworks are frequently selective, with limited disclosure obligations and insufficient coverage of the full policy-making process. In practice, this creates a system where rules exist formally but fail to shape behaviour effectively.
Most countries have adopted strategic approaches to combating corruption, but lobbying regulation continues to lag behind. The gap between regulatory design and real-world practice is evident. While some countries have recently improved their frameworks – such as Finland and the Czech Republic, following earlier reforms in Ireland and France – measurable results remain limited. Weak enforcement undermines market stability, increases uncertainty, raises investment costs and ultimately constrains innovation and economic growth.
OECD data confirms the scale of the problem. Only 7 countries (4 OECD members and 3 partner countries) meet at least 80% of the OECD criteria for high-quality lobbying regulation. Just 20 countries – roughly one third of those assessed – reach 60% or more. This indicates that lobbying governance frameworks remain underdeveloped and inconsistent across much of the OECD area. At the same time, only 10 OECD countries (16%) have targeted anti-fraud strategies in high-risk areas such as agriculture, social spending or dedicated funding programmes, including EU funds.
Serbia illustrates this regulatory paradox clearly. It belongs to a group of countries with relatively strong formal frameworks – meeting 89% of regulatory criteria, alongside Spain, Canada, Estonia, Mexico, Israel, Slovenia and Poland, as well as partner countries such as Moldova and Peru. However, in practice, Serbia meets only 56% of the criteria, placing it below Spain and Moldova (89%), at the level of Estonia and Mexico (56%), and above Israel, Peru and Slovenia (33%) and Poland (11%). The gap between regulation and implementation highlights a broader structural issue: rules alone do not ensure integrity.
In such conditions, lobbying ceases to be a transparent part of democratic decision-making and becomes a source of systemic risk. Without stronger enforcement, broader transparency and more consistent oversight, lobbying frameworks risk remaining formal instruments with limited real impact – while public policy continues to be shaped more by influence than by accountability.
Source: OECD (2026 Anti-Corruption and Integrity Report – 37 OECD countries and 25 partner countries)