Nisko održavana stopa inflacije od 2000-te godine (oko 2%) nije zadavala probleme Evrozoni, jer je tu restriktivnost ECB „peglala“ monetarnim agregatom M3 (do pred kraj 2009. godine vođena je ekspanzivna monetarna politika). Sa usporavanjem agregata M3 i kontinuiranim seljenjem industrija, kapitala i inženjera na istočna tržišta Evrozona se suočava sa problemom autput gepa. Smanjenje aktuelnog autputa i povećanje nezaposlenosti usporavali su privrede Evrozone, posebno zemalja na periferiji koje su gubile konkurentnost i sve se više zaduživale. Cene se smanjuju i poslednjih nekoliko kvartala dominira očekivana deflacija (sa svim negativnim efektima na privredu, primer Japana iz 1990-ih). Trenutno je stopa inflacije daleko ispod cilja i to ukazuje na činjenicu da se već sada pojedine ekonomije suočavaju sa međugodišnjom deflacijom (Grčka, Kipar, Portugal, Slovačka, Španija). Otuda, ne iznenađuju pritisci brojnih analitičara da ECB-a treba da preduzme viši nivo targetiranja inflacije (ekspanzivniju monetarnu politiku)!
Postojanje neravnoteže u Evrozoni između pojedinih zemalja ukazuje na dvostepeni rast centra i periferije. Istovremeno, vraćanje u ravnotežu podrazumeva dvostepeno prilagođavanje. Dok se od zemalja periferije očekuje deflatorno prilagođavanje (praćeno padom BDP-a, rastom nezaposlenosti, smanjenjem cena i zarada), zemlje centra treba da preduzmu suficitarno prilagođavanje (pre svega kroz rast cena i zarada). Naime, Nemačka je zemlja EA sa najavećim suficitom u tekućem bilansu i potrebno je da to iskoriste kako bi povećali investicije i zarade (veća produktivnost rada nego u ostalim ekonomijama), ali i ličnu potrošnju. „Lokomotiva“ Evrozone bi ojačala evro. Istovremeno, nešto viša inflacija u Nemačkoj ne bi opteretila privredu dokle god postoje neuposleni proizvodni kapaciteti. Tada bi ostalo više prostora da se poboljša konkurentnost zemalja periferije na tržištu Evrozone i poveća njihov BDP i smanji nezaposlenost, kasnije i povećaju zarade, a u budućnosti smanji zaduživanje. Naizgled inicijalna loša pozicija za Nemačku brzo bi se pretvorila u njenu korist, jer bi se zemlje periferije vratile većoj potrošnji proizvoda EA (izvoz nemačkih proizvoda), i time povećavali BDP Nemačke. Privrede bi se uravnotežile i nastavile dalje bezbolniju trku sa dolarom (juanom) i vremenom.
Na ovaj način, dalje restrikcije i uvođenje novih poreza u zemljama periferije mogle bi biti ublažene, a pritisci na poreske obveznike velikih zemalja centra eliminisani (strah ECB i Bundesbanke). Dosadašnja (restriktivna) praksa nije dala rezultate i stroge restrikcije nisu smanjile problem zaduženosti. Celina Evrozone je uzdrmana a zemlje pojedinčano dodatno usporene, jer je ugušena potrošnja. Sama Nemačka pokazuje slabosti (negativna reakcija SAD na finansijski izveštaj Bundesbanke) uljuljkana u lošem sistemu (najniži nivo kamatne stope i pad BDP-a u drugom kvartalu, usled pada izvoza i uvoza u maju, kao i trgovine na malo, građevinarstva i industrije), uz veliki geopolitički pritisak (problemi za preko 6000 nemačkih kompanija u Rusiji sa oko 88 milijardi dolara, Francuze koji prete raskidom ugovora o izgradnji nosača avioina za rusku vojsku čija je vrednost oko 1,6 milijardi dolara, Italiju koja beleži razmenu sa Rusijom od preko 30 milijardi dolara, koliko do krize i Ukrajina, britanske oligarhe koji su uložili na ruskom tržištu skoro 65 milijardi dolara). U isčekivanju intervencija ECB (po okončanju geopolitičke krize), Evrozona treba da se pozabavi problemom realnog sektora privrede kroz navedeni deflatorni mehanizam prilagođavanja.
Napomena 1: leva skala odnosi se na promenu (%) harmonizovanog indeksa cena, y0y (Eurostat) i monetarni agregat M3, yoy (Bundesbank) za Evrozonu 17
Napomena 2: desna skala odnosi se na vrednosti bilansa tekućih transakcija u milionima dolara (OECD statistics)
Napomena: Autor o ovom problemu Evrozone govorio 06.11.2012. godine na RadioBGD2.
The low and carefully maintained inflation rate since 2000 (around 2%) did not pose a problem for the Eurozone, as the ECB “smoothed out” this restrictiveness through the monetary aggregate M3 (an expansionary monetary policy was pursued until late 2009). With the slowdown of the M3 aggregate and the continuous relocation of industries, capital, and engineers to the eastern markets, the Eurozone has been facing an output gap problem. The decline in actual output and the rise in unemployment have slowed Eurozone economies, especially those on the periphery, which have been losing competitiveness and becoming increasingly indebted. Prices have been falling, and in recent quarters expected deflation has dominated (with all its negative effects on the economy, as illustrated by Japan in the 1990s). Currently, the inflation rate is far below the target, indicating that some economies are already facing year-on-year deflation (Greece, Cyprus, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain). Hence, pressures from many analysts that the ECB should adopt a higher inflation target (a more expansionary monetary policy) are not surprising.
The existence of imbalances within the Eurozone among individual countries points to a two-speed growth of the core and the periphery. At the same time, restoring balance implies a two-speed adjustment. While peripheral countries are expected to undergo deflationary adjustment (accompanied by GDP decline, rising unemployment, and falling prices and wages), core countries should undertake surplus adjustment (primarily through rising prices and wages). Germany, namely, is the Euro Area country with the largest current account surplus and should use this position to increase investment and wages (given higher labor productivity than in other economies), as well as private consumption. The “locomotive” of the Eurozone would thereby strengthen the euro. At the same time, somewhat higher inflation in Germany would not burden the economy as long as unused productive capacities exist. This would leave more room to improve the competitiveness of peripheral countries within the Eurozone market, increase their GDP, reduce unemployment, subsequently raise wages, and in the future reduce indebtedness. What might initially appear as a disadvantageous position for Germany would quickly turn into a benefit, as peripheral countries would return to higher consumption of Euro Area products (exports of German goods), thereby increasing Germany’s GDP. Economies would rebalance and continue a less painful race against the dollar (and the yuan) over time.
In this way, further restrictions and the introduction of new taxes in peripheral countries could be alleviated, while pressures on taxpayers in large core countries would be eliminated (the fear of the ECB and the Bundesbank). The current (restrictive) practice has not delivered results, and strict austerity has not reduced the debt problem. The Eurozone as a whole has been shaken, while individual countries have been further slowed due to suppressed consumption. Germany itself is showing weaknesses (the negative reaction of the United States to the Bundesbank’s financial report), lulled into a flawed system (record-low interest rates and a GDP decline in the second quarter, due to falling exports and imports in May, as well as declines in retail trade, construction, and industry), amid strong geopolitical pressure (problems for over 6,000 German companies in Russia involving around USD 88 billion; France threatening to cancel a contract to build aircraft carriers for the Russian military worth about USD 1.6 billion; Italy recording trade with Russia exceeding USD 30 billion—similar to Ukraine before the crisis; British oligarchs having invested nearly USD 65 billion in the Russian market). While awaiting ECB interventions (after the end of the geopolitical crisis), the Eurozone needs to address problems in the real sector of the economy through the described deflationary adjustment mechanism.
Note 1: The left axis refers to the change (%) of the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices, year-on-year (Eurostat), and the monetary aggregate M3, year-on-year (Bundesbank), for Eurozone 17.
Note 2: The right axis refers to current account balance values in millions of dollars (OECD statistics).
Note: The author discussed this Eurozone issue on Radio BGD2 on 6 November 2012.