Od kasnih sedamdesetih godina prošlog veka, u Sjedinjenim Državama se povećava jaz između produktivnosti i zarada prosečnih radnika. Pre toga, te dve veličine su se uglavnom kretale zajedno, omogućavajući radnicima da direktnije učestvuju u dobitima od privrednog rasta. Od tada, zarade su se sve više koncentrisale u vrhu raspodele (rastuća nejednakost u zaradama) i prelivale dohodak od rada ka vlasnicima kapitala (smanjenje udela rada u dohotku) – što su dva ključna uzroka ukupne ekonomske nejednakosti (velikog jaza produktivnost-zarade). Stoga, ključno pitanje nije da li produktivnost stvara dodatnu vrednost, već ko tu vrednost prisvaja.
Rast produktivnosti znači da svaki sat rada stvara sve veću količinu proizvoda, čime se stvara potencijal za viši životni standard bez potrebe za proporcionalnim povećanjem ulaganja rada. Kejns je prepoznao značaj tog odnosa: kada plate rastu u skladu sa produktivnošću (osigurava relativnu stabilnost cena i vodi ekonomiju k punoj zaposlenosti), povećanje troškova rada može se apsorbovati bez nužnog stvaranja trajnog inflatornog pritiska. Poratno iskustvo SAD to ilustruje. Između 1948. i 1979. godine, primanja radnika su uglavnom pratila rast produktivnosti (naročito do 1958. godine). Velika potražnja za radnom snagom, snažni sindikati, rast minimalnih zarada, progresivno oporezivanje i propisi o zaštiti radnika doprineli su raspodeli dobiti od širenja proizvodnih kapaciteta na širi sloj društva.
Od kasnih sedamdesetih godina, taj institucionalni okvir počeo je da se menja. Kreatori politika postali su spremniji da tolerišu nezaposlenost (delom usled straha od inflacije), povećanja minimalne zarade postala su manja i ređa, zaštita radnika je oslabila, moć sindikata je opala, a poreske stope na najviše dohotke su smanjene. Te promene su oslabile pregovaračku poziciju radnika i stavile veći naglasak na ograničavanje troškova rada. Kao rezultat toga, dobiti od produktivnosti sve manje su se pretvarale u uporedivi rast zarada za većinu radnika.
Taj trend je jasno prikazan na grafikonu. Nakon 1979. godine, sam rast produktivnosti je usporio u odnosu na prethodne decenije, ali je rast primanja prosečnog radnika usporio mnogo drastičnije. Dakle, produktivnost je nastavila da raste, dok je veza između produktivnosti i zarada radnika slabila. Sporiji rast plata smanjio je troškove rada i mogao je da podrži zaposlenost, ali je istovremeno ograničio prenošenje dobiti od produktivnosti na dohotke i potrošnju domaćinstava. Šira posledica bio je neravnomerniji obrazac privrednog rasta.
Ko je prisvojio dobiti koje nisu pripale radnicima? Ovde predstavljeni podaci sami po sebi ne mogu pružiti potpunu dekompoziciju raspodele. Ipak, širi obrazac koji obuhvata rast zarada u samom vrhu, pad udela rada u dohotku, veći profit korporacija i rastući prinos na kapital, u skladu je sa pomeranjem raspodele ekonomskih dobitaka ka zaposlenima sa visokim primanjima, akcionarima i vlasnicima kapitala.
Ovo je važno jer stagnacija zarada nije samo posledica tehnološkog razvoja. Produktivnost određuje obim ekonomskog viška koji se proizvodnjom može ostvariti, dok institucije i pregovaračka moć utiču na to kako se taj višak raspodeljuje. Stoga, tretiranje jaza između produktivnosti i zarada kao neizbežne posledice tehnoloških promena ili tržišnih sila zanemaruje ulogu ekonomske politike.
Za preokretanje ovog trenda ne bi bilo potrebno žrtvovati produktivnost niti efikasnost. Bilo bi potrebno ponovo izgraditi mehanizme putem kojih se rast produktivnosti pretvara u rast zarada za široki krug zaposlenih: jaču pregovaračku moć radnika, adekvatne minimalne zarade, efikasnu zaštitu prava radnika i takvu raspodelu dohotka koja omogućava da dobici proistekli iz veće produktivnosti dospeju do većeg dela radne snage.
Produktivnost i nivoi zarada su u visokoj međusobnoj korelaciji (r = 0,968), ali to delom odražava njihov zajednički dugoročni trend. Informativnija je korelacija između međugodišnjih promena: r = 0,656. Dakle, produktivnost i zarade se i dalje kreću zajedno, ali nipošto srazmerno. Problem nije u tome što je produktivnost prestala da utiče na zarade, već u tome što je ta veza znatno oslabila. Iskustvo SAD nije jedinstveno. Istraživanje ECB pokazuje da su se realna primanja po satu rada i produktivnost takođe uglavnom kretali zajedno u zoni evra sve do devedesetih godina prošlog veka, nakon čega je ta veza znatno oslabila. U skorije vreme, zona evra je doživela još jednu epizodu zaostajanja realnih zarada za produktivnošću nakon pandemije i energetskog šoka. Slučaj Srbije predstavlja drugačiju fazu razvoja, a ne jednostavnu paralelu. Rast zarada u Srbiji je u poslednje vreme bio znatno brži.
Suštinsko pitanje je, na kraju krajeva, pitanje raspodele. Ako se od radnika očekuje da budu sve produktivniji, zašto bi se udeo koji im pripada od vrednosti koju stvaraju i dalje smanjivao?
Izvor: Economic Policy Institute (EPI).
Napomene: Podaci se odnose na ukupna primanja (uključujući zarade i dodatne beneficije) proizvodnih radnika i zaposlenih koji ne obavljaju rukovodeće funkcije u privatnom sektoru, kao i na neto produktivnost celokupne privrede. Neto produktivnost predstavlja rast proizvodnje roba i usluga umanjen za amortizaciju, po radnom satu.
Since the late 1970s, the gap between productivity and the earnings of average workers in the United States has been widening. Prior to that, the two metrics generally moved in tandem, allowing workers to share more directly in the gains from economic growth. Since then, earnings have become increasingly concentrated at the top of the distribution (rising earnings inequality), and income has shifted from labor to capital owners (a declining labor share of income) – two key drivers of overall economic inequality (the substantial productivity-pay gap). Therefore, the crucial question is not whether productivity generates additional value, but rather who appropriates that value.
Productivity growth means that each hour of work generates an increasing volume of output, creating the potential for a higher standard of living without requiring a proportional increase in labor input. Keynes recognized the significance of this relationship: when wages rise in line with productivity – thereby ensuring relative price stability and steering the economy toward full employment – rising labor costs can be absorbed without necessarily generating persistent inflationary pressure. The post-war experience of the US illustrates this; between 1948 and 1979, workers’ earnings largely kept pace with productivity growth (particularly up to 1958). High demand for labor, strong unions, rising minimum wages, progressive taxation, and worker protection regulations contributed to sharing the gains from expanding production capacity across a broader segment of society.
Starting in the late 1970s, that institutional framework began to change. Policymakers became more willing to tolerate unemployment (partly due to fears of inflation), minimum wage increases became smaller and less frequent, worker protections weakened, union power declined, and tax rates on top incomes were cut. These changes weakened workers’ bargaining power and placed greater emphasis on curbing labor costs. Consequently, productivity gains were increasingly less likely to translate into comparable wage growth for the majority of workers.
This trend is clearly illustrated in the chart. After 1979, productivity growth itself slowed compared to previous decades, but the growth of the average worker’s earnings slowed much more drastically. Thus, productivity continued to rise, while the link between productivity and worker earnings weakened. Slower wage growth reduced labor costs and may have supported employment, but it simultaneously limited the pass-through of productivity gains to household incomes and consumption. A broader consequence was a more unequal pattern of economic growth. Who appropriated the gains that did not go to workers? The data presented here cannot, on their own, provide a complete breakdown of the distribution. Nevertheless, the broader pattern – encompassing wage growth at the very top, a declining labor share of income, higher corporate profits, and rising returns on capital – is consistent with a shift in the distribution of economic gains toward high-income earners, shareholders, and capital owners.
This is significant because wage stagnation is not merely a consequence of technological development. Productivity determines the volume of economic surplus that can be generated through production, whereas institutions and bargaining power influence how that surplus is distributed. Therefore, treating the gap between productivity and wages as an inevitable outcome of technological change or market forces overlooks the role of economic policy.
Reversing this trend would not require sacrificing productivity or efficiency. It would require rebuilding the mechanisms that translate productivity growth into wage growth for a broad range of employees: stronger worker bargaining power, adequate minimum wages, effective protection of labor rights, and an income distribution that allows gains from increased productivity to reach a larger segment of the workforce.
Productivity and wage levels are highly correlated (r = 0.968), though this partly reflects their shared long-term trend. The correlation between year-on-year changes is more informative: r = 0.656. Thus, productivity and wages continue to move in tandem, but by no means proportionally. The issue is not that productivity has ceased to influence wages, but rather that the link has significantly weakened. The US experience is not unique. ECB research shows that real hourly earnings and productivity also largely moved together in the euro area until the 1990s, after which the connection weakened considerably. More recently, the euro area experienced another episode of real wages lagging behind productivity following the pandemic and the energy shock. Serbia’s case represents a different stage of development rather than a simple parallel; wage growth in Serbia has recently been significantly faster.
Ultimately, the fundamental issue is one of distribution. If workers are expected to be increasingly productive, why does the share of the value they create that goes to them continue to decline?
Source: Economic Policy Institute (EPI).
Notes: Data refer to total compensation (including wages and benefits) of private-sector production and nonsupervisory workers, as well as to the net productivity of the entire economy. Net productivity represents the growth in the output of goods and services – adjusted for depreciation – per hour worked.