Nastavak svetske ekonomske krize i njeno produbljivanje rezultat je smanjenog priliva kapitala kod razvijenih zemalja (a manje njegovog odliva). U pozadini stoji strah od inflacije centralnih banaka, pre nego odsustvo poverenja investitora u državne hartije od vrednosti.
Niske kamatne stope u razvijenim zemljama destimulišu investitore. Neatraktivnost državnih hartija od vrednosti doprineo je smanjenom prilivu kapitala. Nizak prinos na hartije od vrednosti traje već nekoliko godina unazad. Slika pokazuje opadajući trend prinosa na desetogodišnje državne obveznice u najrazvijenijim ekonomijama. Opadajući trend je i u drugim zemljama Evrozone (Španija 2,37%; Italija 2,56%; Portugal 3,31%; Grčka 5,58%). Slično je i kod hartija od vrednosti sa drugim rokovima dospeća. Recimo, u Nemačkoj na sekundarnom tržištu prinos na dvogodišnje obveznice je negativan (-0,004%). A poznato je da negativne kamatne stope mogu da razočaraju učesnike na tržištu.
Problem se dodatno produbljuje kod država ili unutar regionalnih integracija (poput EU) sa režimom fiksnog deviznog kursa i visokim javnim dugom. Pojedini ekonomisti (Romer) zastupaju stanovište da se do rasta kamatnih stopa može doći tek kada se vrati poverenje investitora u državne hartije od vrednosti.
Međutim, sa gubitkom poverenja raste premija na rizik, koja sada kao sastavni element funkcije tražnje (pored kamatne stope i deviznog kursa), utiče na rast tražnje. To govori da će gubitak poverenja investitora ima ekspanzivan, a ne restriktivan karakter.
Bolje rezultate od EU pokazuju SAD i VB. Pretnja krize po modelu zemalja mediteranske periferije su daleko od SAD i VB jer uspevaju da kroz monetarne mere (nezavisna monetarna politika) i sopstvenu valutu (fluktuirajući devizni kurs) ublaže negativne kratkoročne fluktuacije sa svetskog tržišta. Očekivani rast BDP u SAD i Velikoj Britaniji može favorizovati državne obveznice ove dve zemlje, u odnosu na obveznice evopskih zemalja. I pored toga, slabi su izgledi da se i u 2014. godini finansijsko tržište oporavi niskih pinosa, ali da će prinosi divergirati između dve strane, to je neminovno. Niži rast u Evropi uspeće da spreči reprizu dužničke krize zemalja evrozone, ali teško da može da istraje bez podsticaja ECB-a (stagnacija i u Q2 2014). U poslednje vreme, povoljnija slika je na periferiji EU – Island (kontrola kretanja kapitala usmerena na sprečavanje investitora da sa lokala povlače sredstva).
Pomenuti pad priliva kapitala, pri bilo kojoj kamatnoj stopi, vodi do depresijacije nacionalne valute. Efekti fiskalne politike ovde su različiti (pomeranje krive IS) i zavise od stepena zaduženosti zemlje – ako je visok stepen zaduženosti IS kriva ide u levo (zemlje EA) ako nije u desno (VB). Kamatna stopa će porasti (Romerova kriva PM se ne mora pomerati) samo zato što gubitak poverenja investitora, kroz depresijaciju nacionalne valute, ima ekspanzivne efekte. Iz drugog ugla posmatrano, ako kod centralne banke postoji strah od inflatornih pritisaka na depresijaciju nacionalne valute tada će kriva LM ići u levo. Javljaju se efekti suprotni prethonom – slučaju gubitka poverenja investitora. Monetarna restriktivnost je još više izražena kod zemalja koje su zapale u zamku likvidnosti (niska kamatna stopa ne uspeva da stimuliše potrošnju, a kvantitaitvne olakšice ne utiču na stopu nezaposlenosti i privrednu aktvnost) i kod kojih je neefikasna monetarna politika. Zato, sa određivanjem kamatne stope od strane centralne banke, svaki gubitak poverenja u državne obveznice uzrokovaće porast kamatne stope ali i slabljenje nacionalne valute (kamatni pariteti), a slaba nacionalna valuta čini domaću industriju konukrentnom na inostranom tržištu – postoji neka korist od gubitka poverenja investitora.
Izvor: Tradeweb (nedeljni podaci)
The continuation of the global economic crisis and its further deepening are the result of reduced capital inflows into developed economies (rather than increased capital outflows). In the background lies the fear of inflation on the part of central banks, rather than a lack of investor confidence in government securities.
Low interest rates in developed countries discourage investors. The unattractiveness of government securities has contributed to reduced capital inflows. Low yields on securities have persisted for several years. The figure shows a declining trend in yields on ten-year government bonds in the most developed economies. A downward trend is also evident in other euro area countries (Spain 2.37%, Italy 2.56%, Portugal 3.31%, Greece 5.58%). A similar situation applies to securities with other maturities. For example, in Germany, the yield on two-year bonds on the secondary market is negative (-0.004%). It is well known that negative interest rates can disappoint market participants.
The problem is further exacerbated in countries, or within regional integrations (such as the EU), that operate under a fixed exchange rate regime and have high public debt. Some economists (Romer) argue that interest rates can rise only once investor confidence in government securities is restored.
However, as confidence is lost, the risk premium increases, which now – together with the interest rate and the exchange rate – acts as an integral component of the demand function and contributes to an expansion of demand. This suggests that a loss of investor confidence may have an expansionary rather than a restrictive effect.
The United States and the United Kingdom show better results than the EU. The threat of a crisis similar to that experienced by the Mediterranean periphery countries is far less pronounced in the US and the UK, as they manage to mitigate negative short-term global shocks through monetary measures (independent monetary policy) and their own currencies (floating exchange rates). Expected GDP growth in the US and the UK may favor government bonds from these two countries over bonds issued by European countries. Nevertheless, prospects for a recovery of financial markets in 2014 remain weak due to persistently low yields, although divergence in yields between the two sides appears inevitable. Lower growth in Europe may prevent a recurrence of the euro area debt crisis, but it is unlikely to be sustainable without ECB stimulus (with stagnation continuing into Q2 2014). Recently, a more favorable situation has emerged on the EU periphery – Iceland, for example, has implemented capital controls aimed at preventing investors from withdrawing funds from the domestic market.
The aforementioned decline in capital inflows, at any interest rate, leads to depreciation of the national currency. The effects of fiscal policy vary (through shifts in the IS curve) and depend on the level of public indebtedness – if debt is high, the IS curve shifts left (euro area countries), and if not, it shifts right (UK). Interest rates will rise (the PM curve in Romer’s framework does not necessarily have to shift) solely because the loss of investor confidence, through currency depreciation, has expansionary effects. Viewed from another angle, if the central bank fears inflationary pressures stemming from currency depreciation, the LM curve will shift left. This produces effects opposite to those observed in the case of investor confidence loss alone.
Monetary restrictiveness is even more pronounced in countries caught in a liquidity trap, where low interest rates fail to stimulate consumption and quantitative easing does not affect unemployment or economic activity, rendering monetary policy ineffective. Therefore, when interest rates are set by the central bank, any loss of confidence in government bonds will lead to an increase in interest rates as well as a weakening of the national currency (interest rate parity). A weaker national currency makes domestic industry more competitive in foreign markets – meaning that there is, in fact, some benefit arising from a loss of investor confidence.
Source: Tradeweb (weekly data)