S početkom krize u Srbiji, od 2008. godine raste broj problematičnih kredita (NPL), ali raste i njihov udeo u ukupnim kreditima. Bankarski sektor je pod velikim pritiskom loših kredita. Iako se njihov udeo smanjuje 2016. godine ostaje visok preostali iznos duga, visoko učešće kredita u docnji u preostalom iznosu duga, kao i visoko učešće iznosa docnje u preostalom iznosu duga.
U bankarskom sektoru Srbije, udeo problematičnih kredita (NPL) u ukupnim kreditima bio je visok tokom analiziranog perioda, ali još uvek nisu ugrozili stabilnost finansijskog sistema, jer je bankarski sektor dobro kapitaliziran i likvidan. Zbog toga su kreditne linije bile u potpunosti obezbeđene. Ipak, oni su postali izvor sistemskog rizika. To znači da udeo problematičnih kredita u ukupnim kreditima nije imao direktnu vezu sa stabilnošću finansijskog sektora, s obzirom da je ovaj odnos zavisio i od rezervisanja i kapitalizacije i koncentracije izloženosti u nekim bankama.
Od početka finansijske krize, problematični krediti zabeležili su kontinuirani rast tokom čitavog posmatranog perioda, izuzev privremenog smanjenja u 2012. godini. Sa niskom stopom privrednog rasta tokom krize, povećani su kreditni rizici zbog visokog nivoa loših kredita, što je dovelo do stagnacije ili čak pada kreditne aktivnosti. Nivo loših kredita počeo se smanjivati u 2012. godini, ali na kratko. Tada NPL su počele da raste kontinuirano do 2015. godine, kada je vrednost NPL dostigla 424,6 milijardi dinara, a NPL-ovi su dostigli rekord od 21,6%.
Struktura problematičnih kredita u Srbiji je veoma nepovoljna. Krediti domaćinstvima (stanovništvu) u ukupnim NPL su zabeležili kontinuirani rast, dok su korporativni krediti (privreda) postepeno smanjili svoje učešće u ukupnim NPL. S druge strane, udeo Ostalih u ukupnim NPL-ima se kontinuirano povećao, sa 9% u 2009. na čak 30% u 2016. godini, što je znatno iznad učešća stanovništva u ukupnim NPL-ima. NPL odnos prema stanovništvu ostaje daleko ispod proseka za ukupne NPL (ispod 20%) tokom celog perioda. Međutim, apsolutno izraženo, nivo loših kredita stanovništva postepeno je porastao, sa 26,2 milijarde dinara u 2008. na 69,2 milijarde dinara u 2016. godini. Glavni razlog je više od trostrukog rasta nekvalitetnih kredita u bankarskom sektoru Srbije tokom analiziranog perioda (sa 131 milijarde dinara u 2008. na 425 milijardi dinara u 2015. godini). Udeo privrede u ukupnim NPL imao je najveći NPL u 2009. godini od 76% (153,3 milijarde dinara), ali najniži u 2016. godini od 50% (172,9 milijardi dinara). Realno posmatrano, najviši nivo loših kredita u privredi u 2014. godini iznosio je 248,6 milijardi dinara, kada je udeo NPL bio 60%.
Srbija je imala visoke stope rasta kredita pre krize. Velika kreditna ponuda došla je od stranih banaka koje su preplavile bankarski sektor Srbije, zahvaljujući svojim jeftinim izvorima finansiranja. Pored toga, najveći problem bankarskog sektora jeste to što se najveći deo NPL-a odnosi na kredite koji su s docnjom više od godinu dana.
Takvi (loši) krediti imali su negativan uticaj na profitabilnost banaka. Ustvari, mnoge srpske banke postale su slabe i veoma neprofitabilne zbog prekomernih nekvalitetnih kredita. Prinuđene, banke smanjuju ponudu kredita što dodatno usporava ekonomsku aktivnost. Banke nisu bile voljne da prodaju zajmove zbog neadekvatnih kolaterala, tako da su tokovi novca iz kredita ograničili ponudu kredita. Takođe, bili su ugroženi kapaciteti bankarskog sektora sa aspekta apsorbovanja gubitaka nastalih po osnovu problematičnih kredita (valutne strukture, ispravke vrednosti, kapitala, izdvojenih rezervi). Iako je tokom 2016. godine smanjen iznos odobrenih problematičnih kredita (u dinarima), kao i njihovo učešće u ukupnim kreditima još uvek ostaje problem visokog preostalog iznosa duga, visokog učešća kredita u docnji u preostalom iznosu duga, i visokog učešćs iznosa docnje u preostalom iznosu duga.
Istina, privreda Srbije uspela je da se odupre pritisku rasta nekvalitetnih kredita sa rastom BDP-a, fiskalnom konsolidacijom i boljim makroekonomskim uslovima poslednjih godina, nakon što su donosioci ekonomske politike usvojili važne mere i preporuke sa jasnim procesima i procedurama za upravljanje NPL-om. Takođe, banke su postale opreznije u pogledu odobravanja kredita. Ako banke nastave sa adekvatnim pristupom i preporukama relevantnih institucija, to će pomoći u jačanju kreditne aktivnosti u narednim godinama. Da bi govorili o oporavku bankarskog sektora, udeo nekvalitetnih kredita u ukupnim kreditima mora biti u rasponu od 5-10% ili manje. Dakle, banke moraju poboljšati svoje kapacitete za upravljanje portfelima NPL-a u odnosu na period pre krize.
Napomena: podaci NBS
With the onset of the crisis in Serbia in 2008, the number of non-performing loans (NPLs) increased, as did their share in total loans. The banking sector came under significant pressure from bad loans. Although their share declined by 2016, the remaining outstanding debt remained high, as did the share of overdue loans in the outstanding debt and the share of overdue amounts in the total outstanding debt.
In the Serbian banking sector, the share of non-performing loans (NPLs) in total loans was high throughout the analyzed period; however, it did not endanger the stability of the financial system, as the banking sector remained well capitalized and liquid. As a result, credit lines were fully secured. Nevertheless, NPLs became a source of systemic risk. This implies that the share of NPLs in total loans was not directly linked to the stability of the financial sector, since this relationship also depended on provisioning, capitalization, and the concentration of exposures in certain banks.
Since the onset of the financial crisis, non-performing loans recorded continuous growth over the entire observed period, except for a temporary decline in 2012. Due to low economic growth during the crisis, credit risk increased as a result of the high level of bad loans, leading to stagnation or even a decline in lending activity. The level of NPLs began to decrease in 2012, but only briefly. Subsequently, NPLs increased continuously until 2015, when their value reached RSD 424.6 billion, and the NPL ratio peaked at a record 21.6%.
The structure of non-performing loans in Serbia is highly unfavorable. Household loans accounted for a continuously increasing share of total NPLs, while corporate loans gradually reduced their share. At the same time, the share of “Other” loans in total NPLs increased continuously, from 9% in 2009 to as much as 30% in 2016, significantly exceeding the share of household loans. The NPL ratio for households remained well below the overall NPL average (below 20%) throughout the entire period. However, in absolute terms, the volume of household NPLs increased steadily, from RSD 26.2 billion in 2008 to RSD 69.2 billion in 2016. The main reason was the more than threefold increase in total non-performing loans in the Serbian banking sector during the analyzed period (from RSD 131 billion in 2008 to RSD 425 billion in 2015). The corporate sector accounted for the largest share of NPLs in 2009, at 76% (RSD 153.3 billion), and the lowest share in 2016, at 50% (RSD 172.9 billion). In absolute terms, the highest level of corporate NPLs was recorded in 2014, amounting to RSD 248.6 billion, when the NPL ratio reached 60%.
Prior to the crisis, Serbia experienced high credit growth rates. A large supply of credit was provided by foreign banks, which entered the Serbian banking sector supported by their low-cost funding sources. In addition, one of the major problems of the banking sector is that a substantial portion of NPLs consists of loans overdue for more than one year.
Such bad loans had a negative impact on bank profitability. In fact, many Serbian banks became weak and highly unprofitable due to excessive non-performing loans. As a result, banks reduced credit supply, further slowing economic activity. Banks were reluctant to sell loans due to inadequate collateral, which constrained cash flows from loan portfolios and limited lending activity. Furthermore, the capacity of the banking sector to absorb losses arising from non-performing loans was impaired, particularly with respect to currency structure, value adjustments, capital, and provisions. Although in 2016 both the absolute amount of NPLs (in dinars) and their share in total loans declined, the problem of a high outstanding debt remained, along with a high share of overdue loans in outstanding debt and a high share of overdue amounts in total outstanding debt.
It is true that the Serbian economy managed to withstand the pressure of rising non-performing loans through GDP growth, fiscal consolidation, and improved macroeconomic conditions in recent years, following the adoption of important measures and recommendations by economic policymakers, accompanied by clear processes and procedures for NPL management. Banks also became more cautious in their lending practices. If banks continue to apply adequate approaches and follow the recommendations of relevant institutions, this will contribute to strengthening credit activity in the coming years. In order to speak of a recovery of the banking sector, the share of non-performing loans in total loans must fall within the range of 5–10% or lower. Therefore, banks must improve their capacity for managing NPL portfolios compared to the pre-crisis period.
Note: Data source – National Bank of Serbia (NBS).