Prinosi na aktivu (RAO) i prinosi na akcijski kapital (ROE) su odražavali visoku profitabilnost bankarskog sektora do svetske krize, a potom je usledio pad. Pri tome, vrednosti ROA i ROE su tokom perioda 2003-2015. godina više nego u ekonomijama u okruženju. Da li su to srpski bankari magovi ili bankama regulativa ide na ruku?
Kako je veza između kapitala i aktive za sve banke prilično stabilna i kreće se u istom odnosu, oba indikatora profitabilnosti ROA i ROE kreću se približno isto, i do 2010. godine ukazuju na profitabilno poslovanje banaka. Tome je doprinela i visoka kamatna marža, dok su kursne razlike predstavljale uobičajeni vid za obaranje dobiti, koji se na kraju godine oporezuje. Postojao je problem valutnog mismatchinga dok je rastao obim kredita sa valutnom klauzulom. Ipak, porast učešća problematičnih kredita odobravanih tokom krize direktno je uticao na pad neto dobitka, a time, i rapidno smanjenje indikatora, ROA i ROE. Povoljne okolnosti za banke postojale su u delu koji im je omogućavao dobru zaradu na hartijama od vrednosti (Repo NBS i državnih papira Vlade RS), bez ikakve obaveze banaka da se pojavljuju u realnom sektoru i povećaju likvidnosti. Ali, ko je još spreman da se odrekne sigurnog platiše, države (čitaj građana, poreskih obveznika)? Banke nisu želele da sredstva usmeravaju u nesigurna potraživanja realne privrede, koja grca u nelikvidnosti! Snižavanjem referentne kamatne stope na Repo hartije od vrednosti u 2009. godini (sa visokih 17,75% na 9,5%) smanjena je profitabilnost ovog vida ulaganja u narednim godinama.
Profitabilnost banaka nakon krize nije bila na zadovoljavajućem nivou. Investitori su čak bili na gubitku, jer je ROE (sa konstantnim padom od 2008. godine) davao niže prinose nego što se moglo dobiti za dugoročne dinarske državne obveznice. U 2013. godini ta razlika je iznosila čak 4,10% (8,89% – 4,79%). Slično je i sa ROA, gde je takođe beležen kontinuirani pad prinosa na aktivu od 2008. godine. Pravilo je da ukoliko opada efikasnost poslovanja banke, tj. ukoliko se smanjuje generisanje prihoda na plasirana sredstva (opada ROA), banka je tada prinuđena da preuzme veći rizik kroz zaduživanje da bi postigla planiranu stopu prinosa na kapital (ROE), koju zapravo akcionari očekuju. Rastući rizik poslovanja banke su pokrivale sredstvima iz kapitala. Time je bila ugrožena likvidnost pa su brojne banke bile prinuđene na dokapitalizaciju kako bi zadržali obavezujući nivo adekvatnosti kapitala. To se negativno odražavalo i na profitabilnost jer se povećavao kapital, rasli su troškovi rezervacija, i smanjivao se profit.
Plasmani banaka su se povećavali iz godine u godinu, najviše krediti. Međutim, struktura aktive je bila nepovoljna jer su aktivu preplavili „loši“ plasmani. Po pravilu, takvi plasmani zahtevaju daleko veće rezerve (rezervacije) što se odmah odrazilo na pad profita (neto dobiti), pa je to dalje uticalo na pad prinosa na aktivu. Istovremeno, smanjio se priliv po osnovu kamata (prihod od kamata) što je uticalo nepovoljno na ukupan profit bankarskog sektora.
Ove indikatore treba posmatrati i iz ugla efekata svetske krize koji su došli sa docnjom u odnosu na razvijene ekonomije. Okolnosti krize nametali su veće fluktuacije ovih indikatora gde je pokatkad dominirao operativni rizik. Takođe, ovi indikatori mogu biti pogrešni, njima se može čak i manipulisati, ili mogu pružati pogrešne informacije o podsticajnim merama koji su pod uticajem sezonskih ili političkih faktora. Ipak, profitabilnost bankarskog sektora u Srbiji u najvećem stepenu bila je pod uticajem pritisaka na kamatnu maržu i rastućih troškova rizika, kao i selektivne regulative (npr. promena strukture obaveznih rezervi, problemi Agrobanke i Razvojne banke Vojvodine, 2012. godine).
Napomena: Kalkulacija autora, podaci bilansa stanja banaka sa sajta NBS
Returns on assets (ROA) and returns on equity (ROE) reflected the high profitability of the banking sector prior to the global financial crisis, followed by a subsequent decline. At the same time, ROA and ROE values during the period 2003–2015 were higher than those recorded in neighboring economies. Does this imply that Serbian bankers are financial wizards, or has regulation been favorable to banks?
Since the relationship between capital and assets is relatively stable across banks and follows a similar pattern, both profitability indicators—ROA and ROE—moved in roughly the same direction and, until 2010, pointed to profitable banking operations. This was supported by high interest margins, while foreign exchange differences typically represented a common mechanism for reducing profits, which were then taxed at year-end. Currency mismatches were present as the volume of loans indexed to foreign currency increased. However, the rise in non-performing loans granted during the crisis directly affected the decline in net profit and, consequently, led to a rapid deterioration of ROA and ROE indicators. Favorable conditions for banks also existed in the form of profitable investments in securities (NBS repo operations and Serbian government securities), without any obligation for banks to engage in the real sector or increase liquidity. But who would willingly give up a secure payer—the state (that is, citizens and taxpayers)? Banks were reluctant to channel funds into the uncertain claims of the real economy, which was struggling with illiquidity. The reduction of the reference interest rate on repo securities in 2009 (from a high of 17.75% to 9.5%) reduced the profitability of this type of investment in the years that followed.
Bank profitability after the crisis was unsatisfactory. Investors even incurred losses, as ROE—continuously declining since 2008—yielded lower returns than long-term dinar-denominated government bonds. In 2013, this difference amounted to as much as 4.10 percentage points (8.89% versus 4.79%). A similar trend was observed for ROA, which also recorded a continuous decline in returns on assets from 2008 onward. As a rule, when a bank’s operational efficiency declines—i.e., when income generation from deployed funds decreases (lower ROA)—the bank is forced to assume higher risk through increased leverage in order to achieve the targeted return on equity (ROE) expected by shareholders. Rising business risk was covered through capital resources, which threatened liquidity and forced many banks to undertake recapitalization in order to maintain the required capital adequacy levels. This further negatively affected profitability, as higher capital levels increased provisioning costs and reduced profits.
Bank lending expanded year after year, particularly in the form of loans. However, the structure of assets was unfavorable, as assets became dominated by “bad” placements. Such assets typically require significantly higher provisions, which immediately led to a decline in profits (net income) and, consequently, to a reduction in returns on assets. At the same time, interest inflows (interest income) declined, which further negatively affected the overall profitability of the banking sector.
These indicators should also be viewed through the lens of the delayed effects of the global financial crisis compared to developed economies. Crisis conditions imposed greater volatility on these indicators, with operational risk occasionally dominating. Moreover, these indicators can be misleading, subject to manipulation, or provide distorted information about policy measures influenced by seasonal or political factors. Nevertheless, the profitability of the Serbian banking sector was largely affected by pressures on interest margins, rising risk costs, and selective regulation (e.g., changes in the structure of required reserves, as well as issues related to Agrobank and the Development Bank of Vojvodina in 2012).
Note: Author’s calculations based on banks’ balance sheet data from the National Bank of Serbia (NBS).