Indikatori ranog upozoravanja (Early warning indicators) od bankarskih udara pokazuju da su brojne ekonomije u svetu na meti novih kriza. U najvećem problemu su Brazil, Kina, pa i Turska. U sličnoj poziciji su i ekonomije iz azijske grupe zemalja, poput Indonezije, Singapura i Tajlanda.
Indikatori ranog upozoravanja od bankarskog stresa pokazuju da je rizik od bankarskih potresa i finansijskih kriza povišen u velikom broju ekonomija i regiona. Oni ukazuju na rizike koji proizilaze iz snažnog rasta kredita prema BDP-u jedne ekonomije. Kreditiranje je poslednjih godina daleko iznad trend linije (10%, odnosno 6%), što u uslovima finansijske nestabilnosti ugrožava ekonomiju. I pored usporavanja prekograničnih kredita krajem 2015. i početkom 2016. godine, jedan broj zemalja još uvek pokazuje znake snažno iznad proseka rasta domaćeg kredita, što bi moglo da seje seme za potencijalne finansijske krize.
Gep kredita i BDP-a (indikator primernog rizika) ukazuje na odstupanje kredita privatnog sektora od njegovog dugoročnog trenda. Rast kredita nastavlja i dalje da bude neobično visok u odnosu na BDP u Kini, Kanadi i azijskoj grupi zemalja (Hong Kongu, Indoneziji, Maleziji, Singapuru, Tajlandu), dok je Brazil niz godina uporno iznad ove granice, a da postoji problem pokazuje poslednji rezultat od 9,9%. Međutim, za većinu zemalja ovaj jaz se suzio u odnosu na prethodne godine. Iskustva iz prošlosti pokazuju da su 2/3 svih vrednosti iznad granice bile praćene ozbiljnim bankarskim udarima u periodu od naredne tri godine.
Veličina jaza cene nekretnina je na istorijskom trendu za većinu ovih zemalja, iako Nemačka i Japan iskaču. Sa svetskom krizom i stvaranjem balona cena nekretnina u skandinavskim zemljama (naročito Danskoj) došlo je do bankarske krize.
Ocena racia servisiranja duga ukazuje na postojanje rizika i takođe ističu neke od navedenih ekonomija. Uprkos rastu kredita, niske kamatne stope su zadržale racio servisiranja duga oko njgovog dugoročnog nivoa u većini zemalja. I tu ima izuzetaka, kod domaćinstava i firmi u Brazilu, Kini i Turskoj gde su više trošili na servisiranje duga nego u prošlosti. Međutim, rast kamatni stopa bi pogurao racio servisiranja duga naviše u velikom broju brzorastućih ekonomija. Uticaj racia servisiranja duga je statička ocena – pretpostavlja se da se odmah prenose promene kamatnih stopa na racio servisiranja duga, a zanemaruje način na koji bi klijenti i poverioci odgovorili na kretanje kamatnih stopa, recimo promenom dospeća, otplatom svojih obaveza ili drugim merama.
Prilikom ocene ovih indikatora, važno je imati na umu da oni ne uzimaju eksplicitno jačanje regulative od prethodnih epizoda stresa. Inače, indikatori za rano upozoravanje namenjeni su za snimanje finansijskih poteškoća u srednjem roku i pomažu u identifikovanju nagomilanog rizika. S tim da treba da obezbede signale dovoljno rano za mere ekonomske politike koje stupaju na snagu.
Izvor: BIS
Early warning indicators of banking stress suggest that many economies around the world are exposed to the risk of new crises. The most vulnerable economies include Brazil, China, and Turkey. Similar vulnerabilities are observed in several Asian economies, such as Indonesia, Singapore, and Thailand.
Early warning indicators of banking stress show that the risk of banking shocks and financial crises is elevated across a large number of economies and regions. These indicators point to risks arising from strong credit growth relative to GDP. In recent years, credit expansion has been well above its long-term trend (by around 10% or 6%), which, under conditions of financial instability, poses a threat to economic stability. Despite the slowdown in cross-border lending at the end of 2015 and the beginning of 2016, a number of countries continue to exhibit significantly above-average growth in domestic credit, potentially sowing the seeds of future financial crises.
The credit-to-GDP gap (a benchmark risk indicator) measures the deviation of private sector credit from its long-term trend. Credit growth remains unusually high relative to GDP in China, Canada, and a group of Asian economies (Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand). Brazil has persistently remained above this threshold for several years, with the latest reading at 9.9% confirming the presence of heightened risk. However, for most countries, this gap has narrowed compared to previous years. Historical experience shows that around two-thirds of all observations above the threshold were followed by severe banking crises within the subsequent three years.
The property price gap is close to its historical trend for most of these countries, although Germany and Japan stand out. During the global financial crisis, the formation of real estate price bubbles in Scandinavian countries (particularly Denmark) led to banking crises.
Assessments of the debt service ratio also indicate the presence of risks and highlight several of the aforementioned economies. Despite rising credit levels, low interest rates have kept the debt service ratio close to its long-term average in most countries. Exceptions include households and firms in Brazil, China, and Turkey, where a larger share of income has been devoted to debt servicing than in the past. However, an increase in interest rates would push debt service ratios higher in many fast-growing economies. The impact of the debt service ratio is a static assessment – it assumes an immediate pass-through of interest rate changes to debt servicing costs and ignores how borrowers and lenders might respond to interest rate movements, for example by changing maturities, repaying obligations, or taking other measures.
When assessing these indicators, it is important to bear in mind that they do not explicitly account for strengthened regulatory frameworks since previous episodes of financial stress. Early warning indicators are designed to detect financial vulnerabilities over the medium term and to help identify the build-up of systemic risk, while providing signals sufficiently early for economic policy measures to be implemented.
Source: Bank for International Settlements (BIS)